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This paper takes a financial network, applies a shock to the system and looks at the resulting
institutions that fail. It considers the propagation of contagion through the financial network by
employing various techniques. The first method calculates unique clearing payments for all the
banks in the system. It also defines fundamental default and contagious failure of any financial
institution and differentiates between these two important concepts.
The second method uses mean-field approximations to make all the banks in the system
identical. It reduces an institution’s external assets so that it defaults and looks at the subsequent
failures that spread through the financial network. This technique provides criteria for shocks
and for initial and successive defaults. It considers cases with and without liquidity shocks.
This paper presents a connectivity measure using Kirchhoff’s theorem. It computes
the Kirchhoff number of all the banks in a financial network and finds the most and least vul-
nerable institutions. Finally, this paper tests the described connectivity measure by performing
simulations on financial systems with a varying number of large banks and analyzing the results.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Within the last few years, bank crashes have led to a significant disturbance of the financial
system in the United States and many other countries around the world. Financial failures have
spread out to negatively affect many aspecst of the larger economy ([2], p. 3). The crisis that
started in 2008 has made it clear that we need a better understanding of financial networks and
systemic risk.
Regulators have found it challenging to foresee the effect of defaults as a result of a lack
of transparency on the structure of the financial system and adequate methods to screen systemic
risk ([2], p. 3). The complexity of current financial systems around the globe makes it difficult
to create indicators that accurately assess the systemic risk of any institution([2],p. 3).
One of the most significant aspects that has been emphasized in the past several years
has been the interconnectedness of banks in the financial network ([2], p. 3). This has lead to
an increase in the probability of contagion, a scenario in which small shocks, that initially only
impact a fraction of the institutions in the system, spread to the entire network ([2], p. 3).
1
2.0 NETWORKS
In order to understand the structure of the financial system, we first consider various general
aspects of networks. Networks that have been studied so far include the Internet, the World
Wide Web, social networks of connections between people, networks of business relations between
different companies, food webs, distribution networks (blood vessels, postal delivery routes),
networks of citations ([8], p. 168-169). A network is characterized by a number of nodes or
vertices and the edges or connections between them ([8], p. 168). While in the past analysis
was focused on small graphs and the characteristics of its vertices, today scientists have begun to
investigate large scale properties of networks ([8], p. 169). This new tactic has been the result
of computers’ ability to analyze large sets of data and by the fact that many real-world networks
contain millions of vertices and edges ([8], p. 169, 171).
The simplest type of network is a collection of vertices linked by edges ([8], p. 171).
However, many networks are more complex than this ([8], p. 171). They may have different
types of vertices and edges, each with various properties ([8], p. 171). As an example, consider
a social network of individuals (Facebook), where the nodes could correspond to men or women,
people of distinct nationalities, locations, ages, incomes or jobs ([8], p. 171). The edges might
represent friendship, work contacts or geographical closeness ([8], p. 171). The edges might also
be weighted to show how well any two people in the network are acquainted with each other (
[8], p. 171-172). Networks can be directed or undirected ([8], p. 172). In a directed graph,
2
every edge has a direction, with some edges that run both ways ([8], p. 172). A graph of phone
calls between people is directed ([8], p. 172). In an undirected network, all edges run in both
directions ([8], p. 172). Graphs may transform over time, with some nodes or edges appearing or
vanishing; some values on the edges and vertices might also change ([8], p. 172).
The degree of a vertex is the number of edges connected to it ([8], p. 173). Every
vertex in a directed graph has a degree, but also an in-degree and an out-degree ([8], p. 173).
The in-degree represents the number of incoming edges, while the out-degree is the number of
outgoing connections ([8], p. 173). In a directed graph, the degree of a vertex is the sum of its
in-degree and out-degree ([8], p. 173). Vertices in undirected graphs are only described by their
degrees ([8], p. 173).
In any network of n nodes, pk represents the fraction of vertices that have degree k ([8],
p. 185). It is the probability that any randomly chosen node in the network has degree k ([8], p.
185). We plot pk by creating a histogram of the degrees of vertices ([8], p. 185). This histogram
shows the degree distribution of the network ([8], p. 185). However, real-world networks do
not exhibit a binomial distribution, but are, instead, right-skewed, showing a long right tail in
their distribution ([8], p. 185). Measuring the right tail of real-world graphs is challenging since
histograms are noisy ([8], p. 185). As an alternative, the (complementary) cumulative distribution
function is plotted to find the type of degree distribution of the network ([8], p. 185). It has the
advantage of diminishing the noise in the tail of the distribution and is defined by
Pk = P (d ≥ k) =
n∑
d=k
pd
([8], p. 185-186)
When plotting the cumulative distributions, power-law and exponential degree distribu-
tions are observed ([8], p. 186). The former exhibit power laws in their tails, such that
pk ∼ k
−α
3
and
Pk ∼
n∑
d=k
d−α ∼ k−(α−1)
for some constant, α ([8], p. 186). The latter distributions show exponential tails, such that
pk ∼ e
− k
β
and
Pk ∼
n∑
d=k
pd ∼
n∑
d=k
e
− d
β ∼ e−
k
β
for some constant, β ([8], p. 186). These two degree distributions are found by plotting the
corresponding (complementary) cumulative distributions on logarithmic scales (for power laws)
or semi-logarithmic scales (for exponentials) ([8], p. 186).
When it comes to directed networks, degree distributions become more intricate ([8],
p. 186). These types of networks have both an in-degree and an out-degree, so the degree
distribution is a function pjk of two variables, taking into account the fraction of nodes that
concurrently have in-degree j and out-degree k ([8], p. 186). The in-degree, out-degree and
degree distributions can all be derived for directed graphs ([8], p. 186).
Networks with power-law distributions are called scale-free ([8], p. 186). Real-world
scale-free networks include the World Wide Web, the Internet and metabolic networks ([8], p.
186, 188). Scale-free graphs show that few nodes have many connections, while most have a
low number of edges directly attached to them. Networks with exponential distributions are
random networks ([8], p. 188). The power-grid and railway networks are examples of graphs
with exponential distributions ([8], p. 188).
Various models have been created to accurately reproduce power-law and exponential
degree distributions of real-world networks. Scale-free network models include Price’s model
and the Baraba´si and Albert model ([8], p. 213-221), while random networks were represented
by the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi or Poisson random graphs ([8], p. 197-199).
4
Price studied the graph of citations between scientific papers in 1965 and discovered
that the network’s in-degrees and out-degrees have power-law distributions ([8], p. 213). Price’s
model consists of a directed network of n nodes where pk is the fraction of vertices with in-degree
k such that
n∑
k=1
pk = 1
([8], p. 213). New nodes are being appended to the graph, at a non-constant rate, such that each
added vertex has an out-degree which is permanently fixed at the beginning ([8], p. 213). The
out-degree of vertices vary, but the mean out-degree, m, is constant ([8], p. 213). m is also the
mean in-degree because
∑n
k=1 kpk = m ([8], p. 214). It is possible that m < 1 ([8], p. 214). Price
defined the probability of attachment of one of the new edges to an old vertex to be proportional
to k+ k0, where k is the old node’s in-degree and k0 is a constant ([8], p. 214). Following various
calculations, Price found that
pk ∼ k
−(2+ 1
m
)
which means that the in-degree distribution exhibits a power tail with exponent 2 + 1
m
([8], p.
214). Price’s model is also called cumulative advantage or preferential attachment ([8], p. 213).
The model of Baraba´si and Albert is similar to the preferential attachment method
([8], p. 215). Vertices are added to a network of degree m and every edge is appended to another
node with probability proportional to the degree of that vertex ([8], p. 215). However, the graph
of the Baraba´si and Albert model is undirected, so that in-degrees and out-degrees coincide ([8],
p. 215). They found that
pk ∼ k
−3
which means that the degree distribution shows a power tail with a single fixed exponent, 3 ([8],
p. 216-217).
5
Solomonoff and Rapoport and, independently, Erdo¨s and Re´nyi constructed a simple
model of a random graph ([8], p. 197). Erdo¨s and Re´nyi called their models Gn,p and Gn,m ([8],
p. 197). They considered n vertices and connected each pair in the network with probability p
([8], p. 197). Gn,p is a collection of all such networks in which a graph having m edges shows up
with probability pm(1 − p)M−m, where M = n(n−1)
2
represents the maximum number of possible
edges ([8], p. 197). Gn,m denotes all graphs of n nodes and exactly m edges, such that each graph
has equal probability of materializing ([8], p. 197). In the Gn,p model, the mean degree of the
network, z = p(n− 1), is constant, so that the degree distribution of the graph is Poisson ([8], p.
197). This means that the probability of vertex having degree k is
pk =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k ≃
zke−z
k!
([8], p. 198).
6
3.0 THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The financial system can be described by a weighted, directed network, identified by a triplet
(V,E, c) that consists of:
• a set, V , of financial institutions, whose number is n.
• an nxn matrix E of bilateral exposures
• a vector, c, of capital amounts
([2], p. 7).
The matrix of bilateral exposures
E =


e11 e12 · · · e1n
e21 e22 · · · e2n
...
...
. . .
...
en1 en2 · · · enn


has entries eij which represent the exposure of bank i to bank j; each eij shows the liabilities of
institution i to institution j, ∀ i, j ∈ V ([4], p. 5-6, [10], p. 834). It is also the greatest short-term
loss of bank j in case bank i defaults ([2], p. 7). Since no bank can borrow or lend money to
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itself, the bilateral exposures matrix becomes
E =


0 e12 · · · e1n
e21 0 · · · e2n
...
...
. . .
...
en1 en2 · · · 0


where eij = 0 if i = j, ∀ i, j ∈ V ([10], p. 835).
The vector of capital is
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)
where each ci is the capital of institution i, ∀ i ∈ V ([2], p. 7). It is sometimes called the share-
holders’ equity, the equity capital or net worth of bank i and symbolizes a financial institution’s
ability to absorb losses ([2], p. 7, [4], p. 5).
3.1 THE FINANCIAL NETWORK
A financial network is heterogeneous and consists of n banks of different sizes whose edges are
represented by eij and the matrix of bilateral exposures, E ([2], p. 7-8). It is directed and some of
the connections between financial institutions are pointed in both directions ([2], p. 7-8). Some
banks are highly connected, acting as ’hubs’ of the networks, while most institutions only have a
few links ([2], p. 8). The in-degree, kin(i), of a vertex i ∈ V is defined to be the number of its
debtors such that
kin(i) =
n∑
j=1
1I{eji>0}
8
([2], p. 8). The out-degree, kout(i), of a node i ∈ V is the number of its creditors
kout(i) =
n∑
j=1
1I{eij>0}
([2], p. 8). The degree, k(i) of a vertex i ∈ V denotes its connectivity and is
k(i) = kin(i) + kout(i)
([2], p. 8).
The total interbank assets of institution i are
ai =
n∑
j=1
eji
which corresponds to the sum of column i in the matrix E ([10], p. 834). Its total interbank
liabilities are
li =
n∑
j=1
eij
which is the sum of row i in E, ∀ i ∈ V ([10], p. 834).
Any bank i in the network has the balance sheet shown in table 3.1 ([4], p. 13, [6], p.
824, [7], p.29, [9], p. 2038-2040). The equity capital, ci, is the difference between bank i’s assets
and liabilities, such that
ci = (ai + ei)− (li + di) (3.1)
([2], p. 7, [9], p. 2039). A bank i in the network is solvent if its assets exceed its liabilities, so
that ci > 0 ([6], p. 824).
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Table 3.1: The general structure of a bank’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Interbank Assets, ai Interbank Liabilities, li
Other Assets (External Assets, ei) Other Liabilities (Customer Deposits, di)
Various graph structures were used to model interbank networks. In one of the first
papers published on this topic, Allen and Gale studied a simple system of four banks which were
connected in different ways ([1], [7], p. 27). They analyzed three types of financial networks:
complete, incomplete and disconnected structures ([1], [7], p. 27). Freixas et al. studied the
money centre structure, while Nier et al. focused their attention on the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi structure
([7], p. 27). Moussa and Cont et al. examined scale-free structures ([2], p.3, [7]).
Structure
A A AB B B
C C CD D D
Disconnected
   Structure
  Incomplete
    Structure
Complete
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Complete, incomplete and disconnected structures.
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Real-world banking systems have also been studied in the last decade ([7], p. 26).
Upper and Worms have have analyzed the German banking system in 2004 and concluded that
it is two-tiered: the larger banks are on the upper tier, while the smaller institutions lie in the
lower tier ([7], p. 26, [10], p. 837). The low-level banks have few connections with institutions
in their locations; most of the links they established are with banks in the upper tier ([10], p.
837). Toivanen considered the financial system in Finland and deduced that it was a three-tier
structure ([7], p. 26). Boss et al., Moussa and Cont explored the Austrian and the Brazilian
systems, respectively, and discovered that they are scale free ([7], p. 26).
3
BA
DC
CC C D D D2 311 2
Figure 3.4. German network: two-tier structure.
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4.0 THE PROBLEM
This paper analyzes the following issue: we have a financial network depicted by the triplet
(V,E, c) and we want to jolt the system and find the number of banks that default as a result of
the shock. We need to define the shock in this financial network, examine how it propagates and
discover its effects in terms of the bank failures it produces.
Two types of defaults are considered:
• Fundamental default is the default that results when a bank is no longer able to honor
its promises, given that all other institutions fulfill their obligations ([4], p. 6-7).
• Contagious default is the default that occurs only when other financial institutions are
unable to keep their promises ([4], p. 7).
Fundamental default of a bank, as a result of a shock, may lead to contagious defaults of other
institutions; however, contagious default cannot occur if there is no fundamental failure.
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4.1 THE METHOD OF CLEARING PAYMENTS
The method of clearing payments was first introduced by Eisenberg and Noe ([4], p. 7). It finds
out how much a financial institution is able to pay at a particular point in time. This procedure
was further explained and used by Elsinger et al. ([4], p. 6-7, 31-32).
To employ the clearing payment technique, Elsinger et al. defined:
• a vector, y ∈ ℜn+ of the total liabilities of banks towards the rest of the system
y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
such that
yi =
n∑
j=1
eij
for all financial institutions i in the system ([4], p. 6)
• a matrix Π ∈ [0, 1]nxn which is obtained from the matrix E of bilateral exposures by nor-
malizing the entries by total liabilities; Π shows how much debt any bank can hold towards
all the other institutions in the network; the entries of Π are
Πij =


eij
yi
if yi > 0
0 otherwise
([4], p. 6).
• a clearing payment vector, p∗ ∈ ℜn+ that shows the total payments made by the insti-
tutions in the system under the clearing algorithm
p∗ = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
such that
p∗i = min{yi, max[
n∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j + ci, 0]}, ∀i ∈ V (4.1)
([4], p. 6).
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The clearing payment vector provides us with two significant insights ([4], p.6). First
of all, it points out the insolvent banks in the system ([4], p.6). This occurs if p∗i < yi for any
financial institution i ∈ V ([4], p.6). Second, the recovery rate for any defaulting bank i ∈ V can
be calculated by the formula
p∗i
yi
([4], p.6). Eisenberg and Noe proved that there exists a unique
clearing payment vector, p∗ for each c ([4], p. 7); see theorem 2 ([3], p. 242, 248-249). Notice,
that in the definition of p∗i , the quantity
∑n
j=1Πjip
∗
j + ci can sometimes be negative. This is due
to the fact that ci ∈ ℜ can be negative for some institutions in the system; some banks may have
a negative balance sheet, whereby their liabilities exceed their assets ([4], p.6).
Going back to the two concepts of default, Elsinger et al. state that fundamental
default occurs if
n∑
j=1
Πjiyj + ci − yi < 0, ∀i ∈ V (4.2)
([4], p. 6-7). The first two terms in (4.2) above represent the assets of bank i. The first term
shows the sum of money that institution i should get from other banks, while ci and yi represent
its capital and total debt. Bank i experiences contagious default if
n∑
j=1
Πjiyj + ci − yi ≥ 0 (4.3)
but
n∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j + ci − yi < 0 (4.4)
([4], p. 7). (4.3) above shows that bank i would be solvent if all the other banks were able to
make their payments. However, in (4.4),
∑n
j=1Πjip
∗
j is the actual amount that bank i receives
from the other institutions.; this means that bank i is effectively insolvent due to the fact that
the other banks make payments that are smaller than the amounts they owe.
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4.2 A TOY EXAMPLE
To exemplify the method of clearing payments discussed above, consider a system with three
banks, n = 3 ([4], p. 31). Suppose that the matrix of bilateral exposures is
E =


0 0 2
3 0 1
3 1 0


and the vector of capital is c = (1, 1, 1) ([4], p. 31). We can depict the banking network with the
following diagram.
3
B B
B1
2 3
1
1
23
Figure 4.1. Graphical representation of the toy-model network of interbank exposures.
B1, B2, B3 represent the three institutions in our system and the number on the arrows
are their exposures. For example, B3 owes an amount of 3 to B1 and a sum of 1 to B2 ([4], p.
31).
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We can calculate y = (2, 4, 4) by summing up each row of E ([4], p. 31). We can also
find
Π =


0 0 1
3
4
0 1
4
3
4
1
4
0


This can be described by a new diagram of the system.
1/4
B B
B1
2 3
1
1/4
3/4
3/4
Figure 4.2. Graphical representation of the toy-model network of normalized interbank
exposures.
The clearing payments can now be computed using (4.1). We now obtain the system


p∗1 = min{2, max[
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1, 0]}
p∗2 = min{4, max[
1
4
p∗3 + 1, 0]}
p∗3 = min{4, max[p
∗
1 +
1
4
p∗2 + 1, 0]}
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Since p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3 ≥ 0, the system becomes


p∗1 = min{2,
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1}
p∗2 = min{4,
1
4
p∗3 + 1}
p∗3 = min{4, p
∗
1 +
1
4
p∗2 + 1}
p∗1 can be written as
p∗1 =


2 if 3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1 ≥ 2
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1 if
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1 < 2
If p∗1 = 2, then 

p∗2 = min{4,
1
4
p∗3 + 1}
p∗3 = min{4,
1
4
p∗2 + 3}
p∗2 can be written as
p∗2 =


4 if 1
4
p∗3 + 1 ≥ 4
1
4
p∗3 + 1 if
1
4
p∗3 + 1 < 4
If p∗2 = 4, then p
∗
3 = 4, but
1
4
p∗3 + 1 = 2 ≥ 4 (contradiction). If p
∗
2 =
1
4
p∗3 + 1, then
p∗3 = min{4,
1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
}, or we can write
p∗3 =


4 if 1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
≥ 4
1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
if 1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
< 4
If p∗3 = 4, then p
∗
2 = 2, but
1
4
p∗2 + 3 =
7
2
≥ 4 (contradiction). If p∗3 =
1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
, then p∗3 =
52
15
and
p∗2 =
28
15
. We check the conditions:
1
4
p∗3 + 1 =
28
15
< 4
1
16
p∗3 +
13
4
=
52
15
< 4
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1 = 5 > 2
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If p∗1 =
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1, then


p∗2 = min{4,
1
4
p∗3 + 1}
p∗3 = min{4, p
∗
2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 2}
p∗2 can be written as
p∗2 =


4 if 1
4
p∗3 + 1 ≥ 4
1
4
p∗3 + 1 if
1
4
p∗3 + 1 < 4
If p∗2 = 4, then p
∗
3 = min{4, 6 +
3
4
p∗3}, or we can write
p∗3 =


4 if 6 + 3
4
p∗3 ≥ 4
6 + 3
4
p∗3 if 6 +
3
4
p∗3 < 4
If p∗3 = 4, then
1
4
p∗3+1 = 2 ≥ 4 (contradiction). If p
∗
3 = 6+
3
4
p∗3, then p
∗
3 = 24, but 6+
3
4
p∗3 = 24 < 4
(contradiction). If p∗2 =
1
4
p∗3 + 1, then p
∗
3 = min{4, p
∗
3 + 3}, or we can write
p∗3 =


4 if p∗3 + 3 ≥ 4
p∗3 + 3 if p
∗
3 + 3 < 4
If p∗3 = 4, then p
∗
2 = 2, but p
∗
2 + p
∗
3 = 6 <
4
3
(contradiction). If p∗3 = p
∗
3 + 3, a solution cannot be
found for p∗3, p
∗
2 or p
∗
1. Therefore, the unique solution of the system is

p∗1 = 2
p∗2 =
28
15
p∗3 =
52
15
We can calculate and graphically represent the clearing payments that each bank is able
to make to every other institution in the system. For example, B2 owed
3
4
of its debt to B1, so
that B2 makes a payment of
3
4
p∗2 =
7
5
to B1.
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7/15
B B
B1
2 3
13/15
7/5 13/15 2
Figure 4.3 Graphical representation of the toy-model network showing clearing payments
We need to check equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) to see if any of the banks in our system
are defaulting. For the first bank, B1, we have
3
4
y2 +
3
4
y3 + c1 − y1 = 5 > 0
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + c1 − y1 = 3 > 0
For the second bank, B2, we obtain
1
4
y3 + c2 − y2 = −2 < 0
1
4
p∗3 + c2 − y2 =
−32
15
< 0
For the third bank, B3, we get
y1 +
1
4
y2 + c3 − y3 = 0 ≥ 0
p∗1 +
1
4
p∗2 + c3 − y3 =
−8
15
< 0
This leads us to conclude that the first bank is solvent ([4], p.31). B2 experiences fundamental
default, while B3 finds itself in contagious default ([4], p.31). The fundamental default of
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the second bank leads the third institution into insolvency ([4], p.31). We can also check this by
looking at the assets and liabilities of each bank. For the first bank,
1 +
7
5
+
13
5
− 2 = 3 > 0
which means that the institution can meet its obligations without difficulties. However, B2 and
B3 are insolvent since they have no capital to dispose of in their transactions:
1 +
13
15
−
7
15
−
7
5
= 0
1 + 2 +
7
15
−
13
15
−
13
5
= 0
Consider the same scenario, with the same n, E, y, Π, but with a different vector,
c′ = (1, 3, 2) ([4], p.31). We use the same algorithm described by equation (4.1) and detailed in
the previous pages to solve the system


p∗1 = min{2,
3
4
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + 1}
p∗2 = min{4,
1
4
p∗3 + 3}
p∗3 = min{4, p
∗
1 +
1
4
p∗2 + 2}
The unique solution is 

p∗1 = 2
p∗2 = 4
p∗3 = 4
([4], p.32).
Since p∗1 = y1, p
∗
2 = y2, p
∗
3 = y3, every bank is able to meet its obligations, so that no
institution in the system defaults ([4], p.31). We can formally check equations (4.2), (4.3) and
(4.4). For B1, we have
3
4
y2 +
3
4
y3 + c
′
1 − y1 = 5 > 0
20
34
p∗2 +
3
4
p∗3 + c
′
1 − y1 = 5 > 0
For B2, we obtain
1
4
y3 + c
′
2 − y2 = 0 ≥ 0
1
4
p∗3 + c
′
2 − y2 = 0 ≥ 0
For the third bank, B3, we get
y1 +
1
4
y2 + c
′
3 − y3 = 1 ≥ 0
p∗1 +
1
4
p∗2 + c
′
3 − y3 = 1 ≥ 0
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5.0 SCENARIO
We consider the following scenario. Suppose we have a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network of n banks
which are connected with probability p ([6], p. 824). Every institution in this financial system
has a balance sheet described by table 3.1 ([6], p. 824). A bank’s average number of incoming or
outgoing connections is
z = p(n− 1) (5.0)
([6], p. 824). An institution i ∈ V has a number of incoming links, z
(in)
i , which represent the
number of interbank assets; it also has a number of outgoing connections, z
(out)
i , which is the
number of interbank liabilities ([6], p. 824). z
(in)
i and z
(out)
i vary for the institutions in the
financial system, but z is constant ([6], p. 824).
Suppose that θi is the ratio of bank i’s interbank assets to total assets,
θi =
ai
ai + ei
(5.1)
([6], p. 824-825). We let θ represent the ratio of the financial system’s interbank assets to all
assets, such that
θ =
∑n
i=1 ai∑n
i=1 ai + ei
(5.2)
and 0 < θ < 1 ([6], p. 824, [9], p. 2039). The interbank assets of the system and θ are fixed ([6],
p. 824, [9], p. 2039). We also define w to be the average value of each individual interbank asset
or loan given out by an institution
w =
θ
∑n
i=1 ai+ei
n
z
(5.3)
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such that, for any bank i ∈ V , ai + ei = ei + z
(out)
i w ⇐⇒ ai = z
(out)
i w ([6], p. 824). We obtain
θi =
z
(out)
i w
ai+ei
([6], p. 825). According to this algorithm, θi, ai + ei (the total assets of a bank) and
the net worth, ci, will vary from institution to institution, depending on z
(out)
i ([6], p. 825).
To better analyze the situation, we use mean-field approximations in our financial
network ([6], p. 825). We let
ai + ei = 1, ei = e, ai = a, li = l, di = d
ci = c = 1− (l + d)
for all banks i ∈ V ([6], p. 825). This means that all the institutions in the system have total
assets normalized to unity; they have the same external and interbank assets and the same levels
of capital ([6], p. 825). From equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3), we can conclude that
θi = θ = a
z
(out)
i = z
Every bank has the same value of c, θ, w and z ([6], p. 825). Furthermore, since a+ e = 1, θ = a,
we find that e = 1− θ and l = θ ([6], p. 825). We now have a homogeneous financial network in
which all banks are the same.
5.1 SHOCKS AND CONTAGION
Various authors define shocks in different ways. The shock to the system might shave off a
percentage of a bank’s external assets ([6], [9]), or it may take off a percentage of assets that
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cannot be recovered in the case of bankruptcy ([10]). The shock might reduce a bank’s capital
through various uncertainty scenarios like changes in foreign exchange or interest rates ([2], [4],
[7]).
We can shock the entire financial network by applying the shock to:
• a single bank and counting the number of defaults that occur; this is repeated for all the
institutions in the system ([6], [9], [10]).
• all the banks at the same time and tallying the number of institutions that fail ([2], [4], [7]).
5.1.1 SHOCKS AND CONTAGION SPREAD BY INTERBANK LOANS
Following the explained scenario, we consider the impact of a shock hitting any single institution
in our network by wiping out a fraction, f , of its external assets; f is a number between 0 and 1
([6], p. 825). We define the phase I shock as
s(I) = f(e) = f(1− θ) (5.4)
([6], p. 825). The financial institution will fail if
s(I) > c (5.5)
([6], p. 825). We assume that no liquidity shock factor affects this defaulting institution, nor the
value of the assets of the banks in the financial system ([6], p. 825). The loss s(I)− c is shared
equally among the defaulting bank’s creditors (since all institutions in the network are the same
and have the same value of w) ([6], p. 825). This happens as long as the loss, s(I) − c, is less
than the defaulting institution’s liabilities, θ ([6], p. 825). If not, each creditor losses its loan and
the failing bank’s customers also lose some of their deposits ([6], p. 825).
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The phase I default of a single bank leads each of its z creditors to experience a phase
II shock of strength
s(II) =
min{θ, s(I)− c}
z
=
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c}
z
(5.6)
([6], p. 825-826). The z creditor institutions will default in phase II if
s(II) > c (5.7)
([6], p. 826).
In turn, this may lead to a phase III shock of magnitude
s(III) =
min{θ, s(II)− c}
z
=
min{θ, min{θ,f(1−θ)−c}
z
− c}
z
(5.8)
([6], p. 826). Phase III defaults might occur if
kcs(III) > c (5.9)
for a constant, kc ([6], p. 826). This may lead to phase IV, phase V, and so on, as the shocks and
subsequent defaults cascade through the financial system ([6], p. 826).
Equations (5.4) and (5.5) give us the condition for phase I failure
f(1− θ)− c > 0 (5.10)
([6], p. 826). We know that c > 0 and, since 0 < θ < 1, then c < f .
From equation (5.6) and (5.7), we obtain the criterion for phase II failure of each of the
z creditor banks of the initial defaulting institution
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c} > zc (5.11)
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([6], p. 826). We find θc, the critical value of θ, by equating the quantities inside the minimum
function of (5.11).
θ = f(1− θ)− c ⇐⇒ θ = f − fθ − c
θ + fθ = f − c
θc =
f − c
1 + f
(5.11a)
([6], p. 826). If f → 0, θc → 0 and if f → 1, θc →
1
2
. We reconsider equation (5.11). If θ < θc,
then
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c} > zc ⇐⇒ θ > zc (5.12)
([6], p. 826). If θ > θc, equation (5.11) becomes
f(1− θ)− c > zc ⇐⇒ f − fθ − c > zc
fθ < f − c− zc
θc < 1−
c(1 + z)
f
(5.13)
([6], p. 826).
We can now graph the lines θc =
f−c
1+f
, θ = zc, and θc = 1 −
c(1+z)
f
([6], p. 826). We
obtain the (1, 0, f) triangle with c and θ as the x- and y-axes ([6], p. 826-827). When θ < θc
and θ > zc, the phase II failure of the z creditors is described by the ( f
1+f
, 0, A) triangle. When
θ > θc and θ < 1−
c(1+z)
f
, phase II default occurs in the (1, f
1+f
, A) triangle. In conclusion, phase
II failures can only occur to the left of point A, in the (1, 0, A) triangle ([6], p. 827). No phase II
default can occur to the right of point A and outside the (1, 0, A) triangle ([6], p. 827). A is the
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intersection of three lines, whose x-coordinate is
f − c
1 + f
= zc ⇐⇒ f − c = zc + zcf
c(1 + z + zf) = f
c =
f
1 + z(1 + f)
([6], p. 827). Phase II failure does not occur if
c >
f
1 + z(1 + f)
(5.14)
([6], p. 827).
c fO
1
f/(1+z)
f/(1+f)
=1−c(1+z)/f
A =(f−c)/(1+f)c
=zc
Figure 5.1. The shaded area represents the region where creditors of the initially defaulting
bank will also fail in phase II.
After phase II has ended, the z creditor banks of the initial failing institution have
defaulted ([6], p. 827). We separate the banks that have failed (z banks from phase II and 1
bank from phase I) from the institutions that have not yet defaulted ([6], p. 827). We calculate
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the number of unaffected banks
n− (z + 1) = n− [p(n− 1) + 1]
= (n− 1)(1− p)
([6], p. 827). Each of the unaffected institutions will face k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , z hits from the z phase
II failing banks with probability
P (k) =
z!
(z − k)!k!
pk(1− p)z−k
([6], p. 827). z may not necessarily be an integer; in practice, z is approximated by the nearest
integer ([6], p. 827). For each unhit institution, we calculate P (k), ∀k, and we find the largest
such probability (P (k) closest to 1) and the corresponding k ([6], p. 827). We let kc be the
maximum of all values k for each of the institutions in our financial network ([6], p. 827). kc
is the largest value of k such that at least one of the previously unhit banks will probably be
impacted k times ([6], p. 827). kc = 1, 2, . . . , z ([6], p. 828).
Since it is likely that one or more banks will experience kc of these shocks, the condition
for phase III default is
kcs(III) > c ⇐⇒ s(III) >
c
kc
min{θ,
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c}
z
− c} >
zc
kc
(5.15)
([6], p. 827). If θ < θc, equation (5.15) becomes
min{θ,
θ
z
− c} >
zc
kc
⇐⇒
θ
z
− c >
zc
kc
θ > zc +
z2c
kc
θ > zc(1 + z∗) (5.16)
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where z∗ = z
kc
([6], p. 828). If θ > θc, then
min{θ,
f(1− θ)− c
z
− c} >
zc
kc
⇐⇒
f(1− θ)− c
z
− c >
zc
kc
θ > zc +
z2c
kc
f(1− θ) > c+ zc +
z2c
kc
θ < 1−
c+ zc + zz∗c
f
θ < 1−
c(1 + z + zz∗)
f
(5.17)
where z∗ = z
kc
([6], p. 828).
We can now graph the lines θc =
f−c
1+f
, θ = zc(1 + z∗), and θ = 1 − c(1+z+zz
∗)
f
. When
θ < θc and θ > zc(1 + z
∗), phase III failure is observed in the ( f
1+f
, 0, B). When θ > θc and
θ < 1 − c(1+z+zz
∗)
f
, phase III default occurs in the (1, f
1+f
, B) triangle. As a result, phase III
failures can only occur to the left of point B, in the (1, 0, B) triangle ([6], p. 827-828). No phase
III failures take place to the right of point B and outside the (1, 0, B) triangle ([6], p. 828). We
notice that B is the intersection of three lines and the x-coordinate of B is
f − c
1 + f
= zc(1 + z∗) ⇐⇒ f − c = zc + zz∗c+ zcf + zz∗cf
c(1 + z + zz∗ + zf + zz∗f) = f
c =
f
1 + z(1 + z∗)(1 + f)
We conclude that phase III failure does not happen if
c >
f
1 + z(1 + z∗)(1 + f)
(5.18)
([6], p. 828).
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Figure 5.2. The shaded area is the region where phase III shocks produce failure.
From figure 5.2, we observe that the region where phase III shocks cause default is
smaller than the area where phase II shocks bring about default ([6], p. 827). We conclude that
subsequent shocks have lower and lower impact as they diffuse throughout the system. Phase III
failure might lead to phase IV, phase V, and so on until the process ends; the obtained results
can be extended for subsequent defaults with resulting equations that are more complex than the
ones already derived ([6], p. 826, 830).
5.1.2 LIQUIDITY SHOCKS
Up until now, we have supposed that banks’ defaults had no impact on the assets of other banks,
with the exception of the losses suffered by the creditor institutions ([6], p. 829). However, this
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is not the case in reality; in the event of a crisis, many banks resort to selling some of their assets
which leads to a depreciation in the price of the assets of the entire financial network ([6], p. 829).
We assume that the value of any institution’s external assets is further decreased by a
factor
q = e−αx (5.19)
where x is the fraction of defaulting banks of the entire system ([6], p. 829). α is a constant that
corresponds to a decrease in the asset price of the financial network ([6], p. 829). In their paper,
Nier et al. state that α represents ”the speed at which the price for banking assets declines with
the amount of assets sold” ([9], p. 2047). When α = 0, the financial system is not affected by
liquidity problems ([9], p. 2048). However, when α > 0, liquidity issues impact the network ([9],
p. 2049). Nier et al. consider several value of α: α = 0, 1.5, 3 ([9], p. 2049-2050).
We now reconsider our scenario, but also incorporate liquidity problems ([6], p. 829).
The initial bank in our network still fails according to equation (5.11); this causes the external
assets of the remaining n − 1 solvent institutions to depreciate by the factor given in equation
(5.19) ([6], p. 829). The other n− 1 banks experience a phase II liquidity shock defined by
s∗(II) = β1(1− θ) (5.20)
([6], p. 829). Here, β1 = 1− e
−αx represents the value of the assets of the remaining institutions
after depreciation ([6], p. 829). In this case, x = 1
n
([6], p. 829). Since α > 0, β1 = 1 − e
−α
n and
0 < β1 < 1. It is important to note that s
∗(II) (which affects n − 1 banks) is distinct from the
phase II shock, s(II) of equation (5.6) (which only impacts the defaulting institution’s z creditors)
([6], p. 829).
We consider two cases. In the first case, the remaining n− 1 banks default in phase
II if the liquidity shock is large
s∗(II) > c ⇐⇒ β1(1− θ) > c (5.21)
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([6], p. 829). We can graph the line β1(1 − θ) = c in the (1, 0, f) triangle, illustrated below in
figure 5.3. Equation (5.21) corresponds to the failure of the entire financial network if β1 > c,
provided that θ is small ([6], p. 829). This can be seen in the (1, 0, β1) triangle([6], p. 829-830).
In the second case, the phase II liquidity shock may not be too large; that is, β1(1−θ) < c
which means that β1 < c, given that θ is small ([6], p. 829). The criteria for phase II failure of
z creditor banks is
s∗(II) + s(II) > c ⇐⇒ β1(1− θ) +
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c}
z
> c (5.22)
([6], p. 829). If θ < θc, then equation (5.22) becomes
β1(1− θ) +
θ
z
> c ⇐⇒ β1z − β1zθ + θ > zc
θ(1− β1z) > zc− β1z
θ >
z(c− β1)
1− β1
(5.23)
([6], p. 830). If θ > θc, then
β1(1− θ) +
f(1− θ)− c
z
> c ⇐⇒ β1z − β1zθ + f − fθ − c > zc
θ(f + β1z) < f + β1z − c− zc
θ < 1−
c(1 + z)
f + β1z
(5.24)
([6], p. 830).
We can graph the lines θ = z(c−β1)
1−β1
and θ = 1 − c(1+z)
f+β1z
. When θ < θc and θ >
z(c−β1)
1−β1z
,
phase II failure (from a combination of liquidity and interbank loan shocks) is observed in the
(A0, β1, D) triangle. When θ > θc and θ < 1 −
c(1+z)
f+β1z
, phase II default is illustrated by the
(1, A0, D) triangle. Phase II failure occurs in the (1, β1, D) triangle and only to the left of point
D ([6], p. 830). Defaults resulting from phase II shocks do not take place to the right of point D
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and outside the (1, β1, D) triangle ([6], p. 830). As previously discussed, the x-coordinate of D is
f − c
1 + f
=
z(c− β1)
1− β1z
⇐⇒ f − fβ1z − c + β1zc = zc + fzc− zβ1 − fβ1z
c(z + fz + 1 + β1z) = f + β1z
c =
f + β1z
1 + z(1 + f − β1)
([6], p. 830). Phase II failure does not happen if
c >
f + β1z
1 + z(1 + f − β1)
(5.25)
([6], p. 830). Figure 5.3 also points out the fact that liquidity shocks make the situation worse;
financial institutions fail more easily once liquidity effects are taken into account ([6], p. 830).
c
fO
1
f/(1+f)
=(f−c)/(1+f)c
1
D
1
1 1=z(c−   )/(1−    z)
(f+   z)/(1+z)
AA0
Figure 5.3. The first shaded area (on the left) shows phase II failure of all other banks from
liquidity shocks, while the second region (on the right) represents the default of z creditors from
liquidity and interbank loan shocks.
Supposing that the phase II liquidity shock does not bring down the entire financial
system but only affects z creditors, a phase III liquidity shock is experienced by the remaining
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(n− 1)(1− p) solvent banks
s∗(III) = β2(1− θ) (5.26)
([6], p. 830). β2 = 1− e
−αx2 shows the value of the assets of the solvent financial institutions ([6],
p. 830). In this case, x2 =
1+z
n
such that 0 < β2 < 1 ([6], p. 830). β2 > β1 because x2 > x.
There are two possibilities. In the first instance, the (n− 1)(1− p) banks all default in
phase III if the liquidity shock is too large
s∗(III) > c ⇐⇒ β2(1− θ) > c (5.27)
([6], p. 830). We graph the line β2(1−θ) = c in the (1, 0, f) triangle ([6], p. 830). (5.26) provides
evidence for the failure of the entire financial network if β2 > c, given that θ is negligible ([6],
p. 830). The crash of the whole system is shown by the (1, D, β1, β2) region in figure 5.4 where
βˆ = f+zβ1
1+z
([6], p. 830).
c
fO
1
f/(1+f)
=(f−c)/(1+f)c
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1 1=z(c−   )/(1−    z)
D
2
2
(1−   ) = c
Figure 5.4. The shaded area represents phase III failure of all other banks from liquidity shocks.
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The second possibility is to analyze what occurs if the phase III liquidity shock is not
that forceful; in other words, β2(1− θ) < c, which means that β2 < c for small values of θ ([6], p.
830). The condition for phase III failure resulting from liquidity and interbank loan shocks is
kc
z
s∗(II) + s∗(III) + kcs(III) > c ⇐⇒
s∗(II)
z
+
s∗(III)
kc
+ s(III) >
c
kc
β1(1− θ) +
β2(1− θ)z
kc
+
+min{θ,
min{θ, f(1− θ)− c}
z
− c} >
zc
kc
(5.28)
([6], p. 830). If θ < θc, (5.28) becomes
β1(1− θ) +
β2(1− θ)z
kc
+min{θ,
θ
z
− c} >
zc
kc
⇐⇒ β1 − β1θ + β2z
∗ − β2θz
∗ +
θ
z
− c > z∗c
θ >
z[c(1 + z∗)− β1 − z
∗β2]
1− zβ1 − zz∗β2
(5.29)
([6], p. 830). If θ > θc, then
β1(1− θ) +
β2(1− θ)z
kc
+min{θ,
f(1− θ)− c
z
− c} >
zc
kc
⇐⇒ β1z − β1θz + β2zz
∗ − β2θzz
∗ + f − fθ − c− zc > zz∗c
θ(zβ1 + zz
∗β2 + f) < zβ1 + zz
∗β2 + f − c− zc− zz
∗c
θ < 1−
c(1 + z + zz∗)
f + zβ1 + zz∗β2
(5.30)
([6], p. 830).
Graphing the lines θ = z[c(1+z
∗)−β1−z∗β2]
1−zβ1−zz∗β2
and θ = 1 − c(1+z+zz
∗)
f+zβ1+zz∗β2
, we obtain figure 5.5.
When θ < θc, and θ >
z[c(1+z∗)−β1−z∗β2]
1−zβ1−zz∗β2
, phase III failure (from a mix of liquidity and interbank
loan shocks) occurs in the (D0, E0, E) triangle. We keep track of the conditions resulting from
phase II failure from liquidity and interbank loan effects. When θ > θc and
θ < 1− c(1+z+zz
∗)
f+zβ1+zz∗β2
, phase III default is shown in the (1, D0, E) triangle. We conclude that phase
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III failure is illustrated in the (1, E0, E) triangle and only to the left of point E ([6], p. 830).
Phase III failure cannot occur to the right of point E and outside the (1, E0, E) triangle ([6], p.
830). We find the x-coordinate of point E to be
f − c
1 + f
=
z[c(1 + z∗)− β1 − z
∗β2]
1− zβ1 − zz∗β2
⇐⇒ f − fzβ1 − fzz
∗β2 = zc + zz
∗c− zβ1 − zz
∗β2 + fzc + fzz
∗c− fzβ1 − fzz
∗β2
c =
f + zβ1 + zz
∗β2
z(1 + z∗)(1 + f)
Phase III failure cannot occur if c > f+zβ1+zz
∗β2
z(1+z∗)(1+f)
.
Notice that, once liquidity shocks get started, the whole financial network can collapse,
even for larger values of c that would guard the system against interbank loan shocks ([6], p.
830). This is in contrast to the propagation of regular shocks illustrated in section 5.1.1 and in
figures 5.1 and 5.2 ([6], p. 830).
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Figure 5.5. Phase III failures as a result of a combination of liquidity and interbank loan shocks
are shown in the shaded area.
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6.0 A CONNECTIVITY MEASURE USING KIRCHHOFF’S THEOREM
We consider an undirected graph G with n vertices v1, v2, . . ., vn. G is without loops and has at
most one edge between any two vertices. A tree is a connected subgraph of G that contains no
cycles ([5], p. 31). A spanning tree is a tree that includes every vertex of G ([5], p. 34).
Suppose that we want to find out how many trees exist in a graph. Cayley’s theorem
states that the number of spanning trees in a complete graph with n vertices is nn−2 ([11], p. 48).
Kirchhoff’s theorem, also known as the Matrix Tree Theorem, asserts that the number of
spanning trees in G is equal to any cofactor of the nxn matrix C(G), where the entries in C(G)
are
cij =


deg(vi) if i = j
−1 if vi and vj are connected to each other and i 6= j
0 otherwise
([11], p. 50). K is a submatrix of C which is obtained by deleting the last row and column of C.
The absolute value of the determinant of K represents the number of spanning trees of the graph
G. Note that we obtain the same number of spanning trees of G no matter what column i and
row i we eliminate (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}).
To every vertex vk in G, we associate the number tk in the following way: we elim-
inate vk and all the edges connected to it and we obtain a subgraph Gk. tk represents the
number of spanning trees in Gk computed using Kirchhoff’s theorem as described above. Let
ti = min{t1, t2, . . . , tn} and tj = max{t1, t2, . . . , tn}. We define the vertex vi as the most vulnera-
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ble vertex of G and vj as the least vulnerable node in the network. In most cases, vi is the vertex
with the largest degree (as shown in examples 6.1 and 6.2); however, there may be instances when
this is not true (as in example 6.3).
To illustrate this connectivity measure in a financial setting, we consider a network V
of ten nodes or banks labelled B1 through B10 connected by 16 edges. We follow the procedure
described above to find the most and least vulnerable financial institutions in each of the three
networks.
Example 6.1
10
B1
B2
B6
B5
B3
B4
B7
B8
B9B
Figure 6.1. A banking network with a node of larger degree.
In this network, the financial institution B6 has degree 6 and more connections than the
rest of the banks. The other nodes in the system have degree 2 or 3. When we eliminate B1, we
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obtain
K1 =


2 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 −1 −1 −1 0
0 0 3 −1 −1 −1 0 0
−1 0 −1 3 −1 0 0 0
−1 −1 −1 −1 5 −1 0 0
0 −1 −1 0 −1 3 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 3 −1
0 0 0 0 0 −1 2 −1


We repeat the procedure for every financial institution in the system and find that B6 is the most
vulnerable bank while B9 is the least susceptible institution.
Table 6.1: The Kirchhoff number for all banks in example 6.1
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
165 542 228 444 141 11 24 144 1084 144
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Example 6.2
9
B1
B2
B6
B5
B3
B4
B
B10
B
8
7
B
Figure 6.2. A banking network with two nodes of larger degree.
In this network, B6 and B7 each have degree 6 and the largest number of connections.
The other financial institutions have degree 2 or 3. Using the described connectivity measure, we
obtain
Table 6.2: The Kirchhoff number for all banks in example 6.2
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
624 316 411 504 28 9 9 168 584 488
This means that B6 and B7 are the most vulnerable banks in the system while B1 is the
least.
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Example 6.3
10
B1
B2
B6
B5
B3
B4
B
B
8
7
B9
B
Figure 6.3. A banking network with two nodes of larger degree.
In this network, B6 and B7 each have degree 6, the largest number of links. The others
have degree 2, 3 or 4. We calculate the connectivity measure.
Table 6.3: The Kirchhoff number for all banks in example 6.3
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
320 220 419 419 84 6 8 1028 0 0
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Here, B9 and B10 are the most vulnerable financial institutions in the network even
though they have degree 3. The second and third most susceptible banks are B6 and B7, the
most connected nodes in the network. The least vulnerable institution is B8.
Note that this connectivity measure using Kirchhoff’s theorem only considers how con-
nected a node is in the network. It does not take into account how large a bank is, what its assets
and liabilities are, or what its exposures in the interbank market are. Consider B9 and B10 of
example 6.3. According to this connectivity measure, they are the most vulnerable banks in the
system; however, if all the other variables were taken into account, this would not be the case.
This is also shown by the simulations in chapter 7.
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7.0 SIMULATIONS
Following the ideas and analysis presented by Nier et al., the Flow Network simulator was used
to model various scenarious ([9]). It was developed by Amadeo Alentorn at the Bank of England
and downloaded from http://www.amadeo.name/flow.htm.
This simulator generates a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network when the user specifies a num-
ber of nodes, n. It specifically creates a financial network of n banks which are labelled B0
through Bn−1, each with their own balance sheet (as described by table 3.1). We have the option
of choosing between homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. In a homogeneous system, the n
banks in the system have approximately the same assets and liabilities and are connected with
a probability p, 0 < p ≤ 1. A heterogeneous system consists of n banks such that m of these
financial institutions (m ≤ n) are larger than the rest ([9], p. 2051). We have to specify p, the
probability that a small bank is connected to any other institution in the system; we also have to
input q which is the probability that a large institution is linked to the system such that q ≥ p
([9], p. 2051). k represents the percentage of total assets that is assigned to the large banks ([9],
p. 2052).
No matter the type of network that is created, the simulator needs to have the value
of the external assets of the system ([9], p. 2041). Users also have to indicate the percentage of
total external assets in the total assets of the network and the net worth, γ, as a percentage of
the total assets of the entire system ([9], p. 2041).
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Once these various parameters are specified, Flow Network creates balance sheets for all
the financial institutions in our network using the following algorithm ([9], p. 2038-2040). The
total assets of a bank i ∈ V are ai + ei and its total liabilities are li + di ([9], p. 2039). The total
assets of the financial network are A =
∑n
i=1(ai+ei) and its total external assets are E =
∑n
i=1 ei
([9], p. 2039).We let δ = E
A
be the percentage of external assets in total assets ([9], p. 2039). We
know that A = E + I, where I is the system’s interbank assets such that I =
∑n
i=1 ai ([9], p.
2039). Then θ = 1− δ is equal to the percentage of interbank assets so that θ = I
A
and equivalent
to (5.2); θA = I and w = I
Z
where Z is the total number of links in the network ([9], p. 2039); w
represents how much one bank lends to another ([9], p. 2039).
Given E, δ, and c, we can calculate A, I, θ, w ([9], p. 2039). We find that A = E
δ
and
I = A − E ([9], p. 2039). We compute θ, w, li and ai ([9], p. 2039). Any bank in the network
is able to function only if its external assets are no less than its net interbank borrowing, which
means that ei ≥ li − ai ([9], p. 2039). We first compute e˜i = li − ai, then eˆi =
E−
∑n
i=1 e˜i
n
([9],
p. 2039-2040). We have ei = e˜i + eˆi ([9], p. 2040). We know that γ =
ci
ai+ei
is specified for the
network and for every bank in particular ([9], p. 2040). We can compute ci for all the institutions
i ∈ V in the financial network ([9], p. 2040). This leads us to find di = (ai + ei) − (li + ci) by
rearranging the terms of equation (3.1) ([9], p. 2040).
Nier et al. set n = 25 with probability p = 0.2, E = 100000, γ = 5% (0.05) and θ = 30%
(0.3) ([9], p. 2053). They performed various experiments on homogeneous networks and also
briefly looked at heterogeneous systems with one larger bank ([9], p. 2041- 2053). I kept the
same setup and parameters as Nier et al., but further analyzed heterogeneous networks. I looked
at financial institutions with one, two or three larger banks. I kept p = 0.2 constant, but varied
q from 0.2 to 1 and performed 20 trials for each (p, q) combination ([9], p. 2052). Each larger
institution holds 12.5% or 0.125 of the total assets of the system. Unlike Nier et al. who kept
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the number of links in the heterogeneous system constant, I wanted to see what happens if the
number of connections increases ([9], p. 2052). The banks can only be shocked one at a time,
with the number of defaulting institutions being counted; this is done until all the banks in the
network have been shocked; the shock wipes off 100% of the institution’s external assets, such
that f = 1. No liquidity effects are taken into consideration in the simulations.
In the case where one large bank dominates the system, we observe in figure 7.1 that the
average number of defaults created by the greater institution increases with q. The mean number
of failures generated by the small banks remains approximately constant.
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Figure 7.1. Average number of defaults as a function of the connection probability q of the large
bank for small and large banks, for 20 experiments for each parameter. Parameter values are
(γ, θ, n, E)= (0.05, 0.3, 25, 100000). m = 1, p = 0.2, q varies from 0.2 to 1, k = 0.125.
When two or three large institutions are part of the financial system, the situation is
completely different. The average number of failures produced by the large banks increases up
to q = 0.7, then decreases. Notice that the mean number of defaults spawned by the small
institutions also slightly decreases. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate a more stable banking network
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than figure 7.1 in the sense that the average number of defaults cannot bring the whole system
down.
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Figure 7.2. Average number of defaults as a function of the connection probability q of the two
large banks for small and large institutions, for 20 experiments for each parameter. Parameter
values are (γ, θ, n, E)= (0.05, 0.3, 25, 100000). m = 2, p = 0.2, q varies from 0.2 to 1, k = 0.25.
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Figure 7.3. Average number of defaults as a function of the connection probability q of the three
large banks for small and large institutions, for 20 experiments for each parameter. Parameter
values are (γ, θ, n, E)= (0.05, 0.3, 25, 100000). m = 3, p = 0.2, q varies from 0.2 to 1, k = 0.375.
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes how the structure of a financial network affects systemic risk by studying
a scenario and performing simulations. However, there are some issues with the ideas presented
here. First of all, the scenario and simulations use a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network, while real-
world financial networks are known to be scale-free ([2], p. 3-4, [7], p. 25-28).
Second, the given scenario and simulations use a simplistic balance sheet and only depre-
ciate external assets. It would be more realistic if the assets and liabilities of financial institutions
were fluctuated utilizing uncertainty models; these use historical simulations to vary the foreign
exchange and interest rates, changes in equity prices and losses from loans to non-banks ([4],
p. 11-15). Furthermore, this might also be achieved using a model of correlated market shocks
proposed by Cont et al. ([2], p. 21-22).
The third issue is that we shock the system one bank at a time; this is not credible
since financial shocks may affect more than one institution at a particular moment in time. This
minimizes contagion ([2], p. 5).
In addition to this, our scenario and simulations make use of institutions whose net
worth, γ, is a fixed proportion of the total assets for every bank in the network ([9], p. 2040).
Nevertheless, in scale-free networks, the bigger institutions tend to be risk-takers; as a result,
their capital buffers are at a lower level than those of smaller banks ([6], p. 825).
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Real-world banking systems that have been analyzed so far suffer from the limitation
that some of the entries of the matrix E of bilateral exposures are unknown ([4], p. 10, [10],
p. 834-835). Financial institutions do not need to declare their exact exposure to every other
bank in the system, only their total monthly exposure in the market to the central bank ([4], p.
8, [10], p. 832). Since the German and Austrian systems are tiered, banks also have to state
their exposure with the head institution and with other banks in the system ([4], p. 8-9, [10], p.
832-833). The maximum entropy principle is used to determine the missing entries of E ([4], p.
10-11, [10], p. 835). However, this method spreads the institutions’ interbank exposures as evenly
as possible which leads to an underestimation of the resulting number of defaults and contagion
([10], p. 847).
An interesting extension of this paper would be to continue the simulations with Flow
Network by looking at financial systems with an increasing number of large institutions (4, 5, 6, . . .).
Will the network get to a critical stage beyond which the average number of defaults generated
by the large banks will increase to bring the entire financial system down? Or will the network
become increasingly stable with a rise in the number of large institutions?
This paper computes a measure to quantify the most vulnerable bank in the financial
system. This could be improved by also considering banks’ exposures in the interbank market
and their balance sheets. It would be interesting to analyze contagion in a system where the most
vulnerable institutions hold more capital than the rest of the banks. Cont et al. suggest that this
would be a good strategy to make the financial system more resilient against systemic breakdown
([2], p. 38-39).
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